$brock

The action names no script-enforced escrow, discloses no recipient or contract address, and gives neither advisory council authority to stop a disbursement - both are explicitly "Advisory - No veto authority" while the administrator designation is "Unconditional" with final allocation authority. The only check is a dRep Info Action, which is non-binding signalling with no on-chain enforcement, so removal is a promise rather than a mechanism; on-chain verification of the prior version found a single-key stake address rather than audited escrow, meaning funds sit under one individual's key control for at least six months before the receiving 501(c)(3) exists. The rest of this cycle uses the audited Sundae contracts with contract-level pause and failsafe sweep, and this withdrawal should not be held to a lower standard. The top-line now reconciles, but WP3's internals don't - Core Track describes 9 participants at 17,500 ADA (157,500) yet is budgeted 280,000, Tooling Track describes 12 at 10,000 (120,000) yet is budgeted 253,000 - and WP1 budgets 100,000 for councils whose stated maximum composition costs 168,000. WP3's 333,000 reserve still carries no return commitment, unlike the other three, and Mill Law Firm is again named for quarterly financial reviews, which is an accounting function rather than a law firm's. Repayment is limited to ~319,000 of unused reserves (~8%). Therefore I cannot accept the proposal structure as presented.

I really do believe in permissionless (SPO-secured) Bitcoin <> Cardano bridging and this is the most promising approach I've seen yet, from a team who definitely knows both Bitcoin and Cardano inside-out. This is my big treasury investment bet for the year, because it does promise a fee-surplus waterfall that splits to SPOs and returns to the Treasury in fBTC (assuming it is successful enough for there to be surplus) - this aligns with my goals for the treasury to be repaid/earn from its investments in diverse assets such as BTC and stablecoins.

Anyone asking for this much Ada needs to be providing financial breakdowns. This proposal includes no FTE count, no rate, no person-months. It's four lump sums: 300k / 1M / 1M / 1M ADA. At ~$0.17 spot, that's roughly $170k per work package with no way to see the labour behind it. Come back with more transparent financial details.

No. Absolutely no. 1/3rd of the treasury drained in around a year is just laughable. Say goodbye to the value of Ada if we allow this to happen, it's a direct sell signal to holders, knowing that much Ada would be dumped within such a short period of time.
I stick to my 200m Ada budget limit and NCL for this year.

This is a much more reasonable price tag than previously asked for this open-source infrastructure that's already embedded in MeshJS/Lucid/Evolution SDK and used by protocols. It keeps in-use public infrastructure working through the Dijkstra transition at a proportionate price.

This is Cardano's only full node wallet, and is a staple of Japanese Ada holders' user experience in token holding and transacting. It is critical that it is maintained - at least until alternatives exist - and this is a fantastic team to do so.

Blockfrost was purchased by a major investor, somehow loses money even while dominating its product market, and is now being offloaded at a loss to the treasury via this governance action. It is not the treasury's responsibility to bail out failed businesses, especially while some great alternatives are popping up. The code is open-source, so if the current team would like it to be community maintained, it simply can be without the absurd price tag.

An employer of mine is still listed as a member on the Cardano Builder DAO website, and while I'm not aware of them requesting funds this round, I prefer to play it safe and avoid any possibility of conflict of interest.

The ticketing industry suffers upwards of $3 billion of unrecoverable losses due to fraud and excessive fees; and upwards of $30 billion of overpayment by consumers due to scalpers and insider abuse. Tokenizing tickets on a blockchain and building a robust and predictable access portal for minting and transacting is one of the most promising use-cases for tokenization. In the event of a successful venture, this could also bring a consistent transaction volume to the L1 which would benefit all Ada holders. I see this as a worthy investment for the treasury, as it is a high-demand market worth capturing.

There is no information regarding FTE breakdowns. How many months will the work span? At what pay rate? For how many employees? Under which titles? $250k for "infrastructure" is a huge bill - what does this include? Are central servers being purchased? Where will they be hosted?
There is also no guarantee that TVL reaches $60M; liquidity remains valuable; profits exceed opportunity cost; or principal is ever returned.
I'd say build the product and prove it works, then come back and ask for investment. It's unproven tech, and importantly it's a Bitcoin L2 like Ordinals or Runes, so it must prove itself first.

I'd like to see some more concrete assessments of who is using Plutarch and Ply, as I'm not personally aware of anyone using them. This proposal itself has inconsistencies/contradictions quoted here:
"During a recent internal audit, MLabs counted at least 26 teams building with Plutarch and Ply."
"During a recent internal audit, MLabs conservatively counted at least 15 teams building with Plutarch and Ply."
Again, more concrete assessments would be appreciated as the only thing that matters is who uses the things being funded. Aiken is the current king of smart contract languages and developer experience, and is a stack whose toolchain handles CIP-57 blueprints itself. While diversity is nice to have, at some point there will just be a clear winner.

Mithril's security depends on signers like me contributing stake weight for free, and if the infrastructure that produces the protocol's actual guarantee is expected to run on goodwill, the same standard should apply to the open-source code contribution. There's nothing wrong with goodwill, collaborative work that improves the developer experience across the ecosystem - a lot of Cardano runs on exactly that. But the standard has to be consistent for everyone. Paying one side of the effort while the other side (the side that makes the protocol function at all) is expected to volunteer their time and expensive infrastructure creates an asymmetry I can't endorse with treasury funds. This isn't a judgment on Mithril's value or the team's work, it's that the funding model singles out code maintenance for payment while treating the equally essential signer network as free.

The TSC is foundational, non-discretionary technical governance infrastructure and one of the more productive committees for Cardano's growth and sustainability. At ~$298K for 12 months it's cheap insurance on high-consequence work, with independence safeguards against vendor capture and a strong accountability wrapper - Appold assurance, milestone drawdowns, on-chain auditability, and return of unspent funds. My one reservation is the missing FTE/rate breakdown behind WP2, which I'd want in future reporting, but it doesn't outweigh the value.

This price is enormous. Intersect makes money by taking a cut of treasury withdrawals it submits on behalf of proposers - which is a valid service, as they put up the 100k deposit so that the proposers don't have to; as well as through paid membership subscriptions. It should not be the treasury's responsibility to pay such a massive amount of Ada to keep Intersect afloat. If it is struggling financially, then it is not a sound business model. Governance will not be impacted if Intersect stops operating. Development of the Haskell node can continue in a forked repository, or repo ownership can be transferred elsewhere. The developers won't go anywhere, only the expensive administrative overhead would go away - and I happen to know from experience that their operations could be significantly cheaper, but it's the conscious choice of only a few people to continue paying for overpriced operational costs. It's time to tighten the belt by a lot of notches.

I'd like this to be the last time we fund this maintenance. I understand that Cardano's transaction volume has been lower than some other blockchains that have this hardware wallet support - and that is falsely used to measure user interest in the blockchain - but Cardano does have a very high number of real humans storing real assets on hardware wallets, versus other chains where most users are bots or people using temporary hot wallets for quick on/off-ramping. Cardano does bring these hardware wallet companies a lot of real business through sales, so in the near future it needs to become their own responsibility to keep up with the chain's growth and developments if they'd like to keep all of those paying customers.

This is cheap to maintain, so I will vote yes this year. However, in the future I will need to see real usage statistics to find out how impactful and useful Dolos really is. Who is using it? I get that it's hugely beneficial that it doesn't require a full node to run alongside it, but most teams and production setups that I'm aware of have no issues running a full node with db-sync so Dolos seems more beneficial to hobbyists at the moment from my current point of view. More usage statistics would help clear this up in the future. For now, let's see how its usage can grow over the next year.

With no profit-sharing deal there is no realistic way for the treasury to ever benefit from this grant. 3,961,538 ADA ÷ ~0.035 ADA per tx ≈ ~113 million on-chain transactions just to recoup the grant from the treasury's fee share alone. That's before any value the treasury is supposed to actually gain.
Two things make it worse for fee recovery specifically:

1. Batching is a design goal here. The proposal explicitly delivers "batched transactions" - meaning thousands of card swipes settle as one on-chain tx. That's good for users and throughput, but it deliberately minimizes the number of fee-generating transactions. Wirex's "$20B volume / 7M users" doesn't translate into 7M on-chain txs; it collapses into far fewer settlements.
2. Wirex's scale is off-chain. Card payments, Visa rails, and stablecoin banking mostly happen in Wirex's own systems. Only settlement/anchoring touches Cardano, so the on-chain fee footprint is a small fraction of the headline activity.
   Ultimately, this is an irresponsible spend, not an investment. The treasury needs to be doing much more of the latter.

Same rationale as the first submission: As a user of Eternl from the beginning, I see Eternl as critical infrastructure for the entire ecosystem and I find its maintenance costs to be very reasonable. The extra features that Eternl provides over other Cardano wallets are actually crucial for many such as myself. That is justification enough for my Yes vote. I would like to see Eternl move towards profit generation, however as a product manager myself I cannot see a realistic path to this. I do believe that someone will usually come around to offer a free version of any paywalled service, though I acknowledge that the lifespan of the free version is usually not long. All that is to say, I am interested to see where Eternl will take the paid features and how many users will pay for them.

Cardano Protocol Version 11 delivers technical improvements including a Plutus cost model update for more accurate smart contract pricing, better ledger consistency, and stronger node-level security, while laying the groundwork for the upcoming Dijkstra era and eventual Leios scaling upgrade - all as a low-disruption intra-era change that avoids launching a new ledger era, minimizing impact on wallets, exchanges, and dApps.

This deploys otherwise-idle treasury ADA into a proven, Cardano-native product rather than spending it as a grant: the treasury retains ownership throughout, and 100% of principal plus realized yield is contractually returned within 12 months, making this net-positive rather than an outflow. Strike has already shown real product-market fit with over $1.13B in cumulative volume and more than half of Cardano's trading activity - so it funds existing momentum, not a speculative bet. Custody is protected by an independent multisig that controls both funds and wind-down, so return doesn't depend on Strike, and the deployment is bounded by drawdown triggers, monthly reporting, third-party assurance, and a fresh vote for any renewal. It generates yield, keeps derivatives activity inside Cardano, and models a low-dependency approach to productive treasury use.
My only concern with this proposal is the market timing. I have a hard time letting 9 million ADA get swapped to a stablecoin at the bottom of the market, when a market rebound of significantly more than 10% is expected within the year, meaning that if the treasury held the ADA instead, it would still be 9 million ADA - whereas if Strike turns a 10% profit in USD value, that USD might not even be able to buy 9 million ADA to return to the treasury. I would like to see USDM returned to the treasury instead of ADA in this case, and for the partnership to continue for another year after that, setting the precedent that the treasury invests in yield-generating business partnerships and not just endless grants.

This reimbursement is long overdue. Send the deposit plus its lost staking rewards back to the original address and let it be done.

I have a different view of how governance should be refined, which can be read here: https://brockcardano.substack.com/p/cardano-funds-answers-to-questions

While 7 is more ideal than 5, this is a volunteer position at the moment, so it will become increasingly difficult to find people willing to do the work. If we drop below the minimum size parameter, all governance freezes until enough members are added to fill the minimum seats. Lowering the minimum (even temporarily, until compensation is decided) reduces the risk of this happening in the near future.

The ₳5,100,781 ask is small and milestone-gated, covering performance optimization (targeting 2-10x improvements in snapshot signing and memory), node operability and observability, ecosystem support, and maintenance. The work improves a system that current production users depend on, and for a reasonable price that is conscious of the current market conditions and weak Ada value.

This work delivers Peras v1 to mainnet (faster finality, ~2 min vs ~12 min) - the one item with no other funded delivery vehicle in the 2026 cycle - plus History Expiry (SPO storage economics under Leios) and Conformance Testing to de-risk both. The resubmission cuts scope from 17 packages to 3 and budget ~54% (₳18.26M vs ₳39.79M), keeping the load-bearing work and dropping peripheral tooling. Tweag has led Cardano consensus/ledger since 2018, with a disclosed rate card ($176/hr, ₳0.25/ADA) and ₳11.07M prior receipts tracked on-chain. The only tradeoff vs the original proposal is losing Peras v2's Hard Fork Combinator window, which is acceptable since v1 mainnet is the priority and v2 can follow later, hopefully in better market conditions with a stronger Ada value.

Sticking with my stance that these market conditions are not ones to be spending so much Ada on marketing/events.

The treasury is being asked to take venture-level risk without venture-level terms: 10M ADA, half of it paid unconditionally on approval, with no revenue share…The treasury is being asked to take venture-level risk without venture-level terms: 10M ADA, half of it paid unconditionally on approval, with no revenue share, no equity, and no repayment - only clawbacks on failure. The proposal frames its "return" as ecosystem value, but the treasury captures only ~20% of network transaction fees, and even on the proposal's own optimistic 112.5M-transaction-per-year projection, that share wouldn't recoup 10M ADA until well past 2030 - on forecasts that are entirely unverifiable. If the treasury is acting as a VC here, it needs a defined percentage of programme income directed back to it; as written, the upside is privatized to commercial partners while the treasury carries the cost. And the timing makes it worse: funding an expensive, return-free programme while ADA is depressed in fiat terms means spending the ecosystem's reserves cheap for nothing contractual in return. I'd support a resubmission that includes a treasury income share.

As a user of Eternl from the beginning, I see Eternl as critical infrastructure for the entire ecosystem and I find its maintenance costs to be very reasonable. The extra features that Eternl provides over other Cardano wallets are actually crucial for many such as myself. That is justification enough for my Yes vote. I would like to see Eternl move towards profit generation, however as a product manager myself I cannot see a realistic path to this. I do believe that someone will usually come around to offer a free version of any paywalled service, though I acknowledge that the lifespan of the free version is usually not long. All that is to say, I am interested to see where Eternl will take the paid features and how many users will pay for them.

I have not witnessed a heavy demand for JVM development support within Cardano, so I do not believe this is the time to spend so much on this effort. That's not to say the time won't come one day.

The budget doesn't fully reconcile. WP2's line items sum to 5.7M, not the stated 6M - a 300K gap. The year-by-year summary does put WP2 at 6M, so the shortfall is specifically in WP2's own category table. Separately, the standalone Operations table totals 1.89M, while WP1's own category split is 1M staffing + 500K ops + 500K councils = 2M - two different breakdowns of the same budget. The top-line and year columns do reconcile to 12M, but these internals don't. WP3's 1M "program reserve" carries no treasury-return commitment, unlike WP2's portfolio reserve, WP5's activation reserve, and the operational contingency - so roughly 1M is discretionary spend with no return commitment. And "Mill Law Firm" is named as the auditor doing quarterly financial reviews, which is odd, since financial audits are typically an accounting-firm task rather than a law firm's.

Sticking to my initial vote decision for this, and it's an even easier decision now that Pebble was separated: Three new nodes on the treasury payroll at once may seem like too many, however a browser-capable node is incredibly valuable. So for that alone, this has my support.

Cardano Foundation's purpose of existence is to fund things like this themselves using the massive amount of genesis ADA they were given, and the staking profits accumulated since.

Maintaining Cardano's TypeScript ecosystem is very important - so many things are built on a TypeScript stack. HLabs brings fair value for quality work, so this gets a yes from me.

Cardano Foundation's purpose of existence is to fund things like this themselves using the massive amount of genesis ADA they were given, and the staking profits accumulated since.

A very interesting RWA concept, however I have doubts about the scalability accuracy of the Bio-ID solution. Demoing one fruit being identified doesn't prove that this can be scaled to hundreds of millions of unique fruits. At very least, a larger sample size is needed. I'd want to see hundreds of unique fruits going through multiple rounds of week-separated tests to prove that skin degradation over time does not impact the unique fruit's identifiability. Even if the system achieves 99.9% accuracy that's 180,000 misidentifications per season. In a fraud-prevention context, false negatives are catastrophic, and false positives destroy farmer trust. This feels like an investment risk that the treasury is not designed or currently equipped to take on.

Cardano Foundation's purpose of existence is to fund things like this themselves using the massive amount of genesis ADA they were given, and the staking profits accumulated since.

In my opinion, IO needs to downsize its operations and take on less tasks at a time. The treasury spending expectations are wildly unrealistic. If they proposed one or two development tasks per year, they could put more focus into each task and get them finished in a more timely manner. The treasury cannot afford to be drained so heavily every year by a single organization. IO is competing heavily with itself in the amount of funding proposals they're submitting, so unfortunately this research task has been beat out by other development tasks they've proposed.

This would deliver Peras v1 and v2 mainnet readiness - the faster finality upgrade (~2 min vs ~12 min today) that has no other funded delivery vehicle anywhere in the 2026 governance cycle. Beyond Peras, the proposal covers History Expiry (critical for SPO storage sustainability under Leios throughput increases), the Hoarding Node (network observability and adversarial behaviour detection), the Hard Fork Mempool Bridger (transaction preservation during fork incidents), conformance testing for both Peras and Leios, and mutation testing infrastructure. Tweag has been embedded in Cardano's core infrastructure since 2018 - they implemented Ouroboros Genesis and led the consensus and ledger teams. Critically, Tweag's existing track record and disclosed rate card ($176/hour, ₳0.25/ADA conversion, two-year fixed-price packages) provide cost transparency. This is the model the ecosystem should reward and replicate.

The VacuumLabs co-venture is the right model - distributing stewardship of critical language infrastructure to a specialist third party is exactly the direction Cardano's development ecosystem needs to travel. Lower UPLC execution costs directly increase effective smart contract throughput without requiring protocol parameter changes. The conformance testing framework (Workstream 2) is essential infrastructure for node diversity and directly complements Tweag's own conformance testing work. The security audit of the Plutus evaluator is overdue given increasing DApp TVL. At 11.88M ADA with this co-venture structure, this is a responsible spend.

Most active Cardano developers will not use formal verification tooling in the near term, and the institutional TVL benefit that justifies the investment scale is a long-tail outcome. With all of the other developments being proposed, adding 13.08M ADA for tooling with a narrow current addressable audience is not the best use of the remaining budget. Resubmit in a future cycle once Blaster adoption among Cardano developers has broadened to justify the investment scale.

The 62.1M ADA ask covers only Q3 2026 to Q1 2027 (approximately nine months) with no published FTE breakdown, no disclosed rate card, and no competitive process. That figure demands independent justification that has not been provided. Furthermore, the parallel Tweag proposal demonstrates that non-IO teams have the depth and transparency to deliver core Cardano infrastructure competitively. Voting "Yes" on an uncontested, financially opaque maintenance would be irresponsible in my opinion.

Leios remains the most consequential long-term protocol initiative in the Cardano ecosystem. The 2030 target of 27 million monthly transactions is structurally unachievable without it. CIP-164 is merged, a public testnet is imminent, and the consortium model - explicitly including Tweag and TxPipe as delivery partners - is the right structural direction for Cardano core development. IO owns the Leios research and protocol specification, so there is no opportunity to wait for proposals from other teams here. The Leios testnet targeting June 2026 and mainnet by end-2026 are ambitious milestones that should be held to strict community accountability, however if achieved that means we can finally be done funding Leios' initial development.

I find this to be a very fair value-per-ADA proposal from the IO portfolio at only 3.6M ADA. The cardano-init scaffolding CLI, OpenZeppelin-style ContractsLibrary, unified Developer HUB, community bounties, and controlled hackathon with a built-in quantitative baseline collectively address the leading causes of developer attrition from Cardano as identified by a survey of 109 active developers. The measurable KPI (30%+ improvement in developer growth rate benchmarked against a hackathon baseline) makes this one of the few proposals in the entire portfolio with genuine accountability built in.

This should have been completed with the 2.1M ADA of funding it received last year at a high ADA-USD value. The L2 entity structure remains "under active exploration", Midgard's mainnet target depends on incomplete penetration testing, and the data availability layer is prototype-only. Given market conditions, I'm prioritizing the funding of L1 scaling initiatives before L2 developments this year.

Babel Fees and CIP-159 are features worth building, however due to the lack of budget transparency I must vote no. There's no FTE count, no per-role cost breakdown, and no individual compensation figures. Therefore it is impossible to judge whether this is a fair price or not.

This is a commercial DeFi product with a viable venture capital funding pathway. Treasury funds may occasionally be used to fund products with high user acquisition potential but a lack of early-day profit generation, but should not subsidise products with established profit models when private capital alternatives exist. The BitVM bridge depends on technology whose honest-operator security assumptions are not yet battle-tested at production scale.

It is not the treasury's responsibility to fund updates to profit-generating products that were acquired by founding entities.

Three new nodes on the treasury payroll at once may seem like too many, however a browser-capable node is incredibly valuable. So for that alone, this has my support.

Given that these events have absolutely no return on investment, we are not the market conditions to be spending such an enormous amount of money on events. ADA's value was $0.90 on the day of last year's Cardano Summit, and has only gone down since the event, sitting at $0.25 today. This is the time to put our heads down and build what the future needs, not get together and party.

It does make sense to me that CF would oversee Catalyst, rather than IOG which is the primary development arm of Cardano's founding entities. If they see this as a better fit, I have no objections.

One of my focuses for 2026 is to fund two new Cardano nodes and to see them show great development progress. Node development by determined teams like Blink Labs costs the treasury significantly less than the Haskell node costs to maintain, and Go is a developer-friendly programming language that could enable a lot of developers to explore development on Cardano. Dingo's development progress is already showing great success, producing blocks on testnet, so I feel it is a no-brainer to fund it to the finish line.

800,000 ADA and no liquidity provided is off to a terrible start. I do not believe in this strategy of inorganic liquidity provision with excessive overhead costs. We should be incentivizing organic liquidity instead, which would require no expensive legal entity and would directly bring in liquidity from other DeFi ecosystems, as the yield would be attractive. Especially now that we have an official bridge for USDC<>USDCx.

I went back and forth on this proposal a lot. The primary factor that had me doubting it is that we previously gave this group 1.64M ADA and received absolutely no KPIs nor ROI data in return. The money seemingly went to a paid trip for some developers and no tangible benefit to the ecosystem nor treasury. Maybe their efforts require more time to come to fruition, but I cannot locate any sign of intent to provide this information to the community. And just as a reminder, I voted No on their last (Catalyst) proposal.

What is making me change my mind and vote Yes on this proposal is that it comes with a 6-year deployment horizon which is a much longer commitment than I've seen anyone else offer; and we also have no other VC efforts currently. This new proposal promises quarterly reporting and a public KPI dashboard, which is a significant improvement from their last proposal.

At the risk of "fool me twice...", I do not see any other signs of VC activity entering our ecosystem, so I would resent if we did not at least give this a try. I also appreciate the tranche formatting, so that I can still change my mind later on and vote No on future withdrawal actions.

I voted "no" on the info action, so naturally I will vote "no" for the withdrawal action. Refer to my info action vote rationale for more information.

This seems like a constructive maturation of the current version of the constitution. These changes add clarity and more formalized treasury management while maintaining the same ethos of the current version. The most impactful changes are:

• Treasury governance becomes much more structured and auditable with mandatory disclosure, audit, and administrator requirements
• Monetary policy expands from a simple supply cap to actively seeking to preserve Ada's utility
• Anti-corruption measures prohibiting vote-buying by dReps
• Enhanced transparency through immutability requirements and role overlap disclosures
• Clarified rights for Ada owners in the governance process

I personally have no conflicts nor opinions on the name of the next hard fork. I'll leave it up to those who knew Max better.

This parameter change is well researched and beneficial.

It is not the treasury's responsibility to fund yet another DEX. Cardano DEXs are profitable enough products, so if the technology advancement of this DEX is sufficient enough to capture DeFi market share within the ecosystem, it will be profitable enough to pay for its own development.

This is once again a massively excessive NCL. I was right about the last NCL being way too high and causing public caution against buying the Ada token. The NCL is a public declaration of how much Ada can and most likely will be sold over the time period. It is not just an "upper limit" to spending as some suggest, it is effectively a spending target. So long as there is money on the table, people will propose ways to spend it, and as we witnessed last year that Ada will get spent. With a higher ceiling, every proposal is bound to be inflated to take advantage of how much Ada is available. We have seen nearly no returns on our last year's excessive spending beyond core development, and nothing suggests that there will be any change to that in the next year. We must tighten our belt and be much more demanding in our expectations of treasury-funded ventures. We can not spend millions of Ada fronting the bill for conference events and parties that do not pay back the treasury after profiting on ticket prices, all while the Ada token sinks in value. We can not be funding un-proven development teams to build products with no demand. It all starts with the NCL. And beyond the size of the NCL being excessive, the time period is also just absurd. We need to stick to calendar-year timeframes. Throwing in strange timeframes such as 16-month terms appears as an attempt to obfuscate and complicate the tracking of spending data over time. It makes us look both dishonest and amateurish.

I agree with these pillars and KPIs and I have similar expectations for where Cardano will be in 2030, so I see this as a useful north star for dReps to follow when voting on future governance actions - especially treasury withdrawals.

I recognize the benefit to having at least 1 additional CC member so that in the case of a CC member retirement our governance is not entirely paused. Christina received a lot of support in the off-chain vote (nearly tying for first place), and there are no other comparable options for an additional CC member.

Same context as the Info Action for this withdrawal:
This proposal could bring a lot of value to Cardano's ecosystem, value that is long overdue, and I am supportive of this proposal. However, I only have a little over 1.2m Ada left in my 200m fund voting budget for this year, so this would far exceed my limit. I will however simply abstain so as to not appear against this proposal nor contribute to its blocking. I am confident it will pass without my "Yes" vote.

Although I have been outspoken against the excessively large NCL that is currently active, I do not see any threat posed by extending it eight more epochs - this not an increase of the NCL, only an increase of the timeframe it is active for.

Cardano Curia was the winner of the vote and this enactment is required by the constitution for governance to continue uninterrupted.

This proposal could bring a lot of value to Cardano's ecosystem, value that is long overdue, and I am supportive of this proposal. However, I only have a little over 1.2m Ada left in my 200m fund voting budget for this year, so this would far exceed my limit. I will however simply abstain so as to not appear against this proposal nor contribute to its blocking. I am confident it will pass without my "Yes" vote.

This reimbursement is long overdue.

The Cardano ecosystem has multiple lending products that I'm sure would be happy to facilitate this loan as they have done for the listing fee loans of other projects. Cardano-based projects should be utilizing and supporting the products that are built on Cardano and not trying to work around them.

This is a private business decision that any entity could make, it does not require the permission of Ada holders and has no direct impact on the blockchain.

This math works out to be a very minimal wage for the amount of work required by the members of the CC. It is important to remember that although there are only 5 CC seats requesting compensation, there are approximately 5 people per those 5 seats, so ~40k ADA per person (less than $20k USD at today's ADA-USD rate) for a year's work is incredibly fair and should only be considered a starting point.

I am abstaining because, while I agree with this vision for Cardano's next 5 years, it is not clear what this vote is meant to achieve. It seems like a very expensive and purposeless info action that was not requested by the authors of the content itself.

While only 2,261,207 Ada of withdrawals remain in my personal 200m limit for the first year, I still tried my best to consider this budget. I'd like to break down my thought process so that it can be used as a constructive critique to improve the proposed execution of this concept in the future. I do believe liquidity is an issue in our ecosystem, but this proposal itself is not ready yet. I formed a strong argument for both sides, then carefully reasoned to the mode stance for each point and which side of the vote that stance leaned towards. Ultimately, the mode stances averaged out to leaning on the "no" side, so my budget limit wouldn't have mattered.

Point-by-Point Middle (Mode) Ground Assessment:

1. Sell Pressure Impact
   Mode Stance: The truth lies between "no impact" and "massive pressure". 32.5M Ada sold over 2-3 months will create some downward pressure, but professional OTC handling can minimize it. The proposal should commit to specific OTC partnerships and maximum daily sale limits. We need guarantees on this, not just best-effort.
   Leans: Slightly against - too vague on execution details for such a large amount.

2. Revenue Projections
   Mode Stance: 4% is neither terrible nor impressive. It's realistic for risk-adjusted returns but underwhelming for treasury deployment. The 85% reinvestment makes sense for compounding but reduces near-term treasury benefit.
   Leans: Against - treasury funds should generate better returns.

3. Perpetual Structure & Accountability
   Mode Stance: Perpetual funds can work with proper oversight. The tDAO mechanism is innovative, but the 25% quorum is concerning. A sunset clause (such as mandatory review/renewal every 3 years) would be better.
   Leans: Against - too much permanent control without enough safeguards.

4. Liquidity Bootstrapping Logic
   Mode Stance: Cardano does have a liquidity problem, and protocol-owned liquidity is superior to mercenary capital. However, $50M might be overkill - $10-20M could test the thesis first.
   Leans: For - the problem is real, but the solution size is debatable.

5. Committee Composition
   Mode Stance: Having experienced ecosystem players is valuable, but the concentration of founding entities is concerning. A mix of 50% ecosystem veterans and 50% independent members would be better.
   Leans: Slightly against - too much insider concentration for this fund size.

6. Protocol Selection Process
   Mode Stance: Some discretion is necessary for efficiency, but the criteria should be more explicit. A scoring rubric and public comment period for selections would improve transparency.
   Leans: Against - needs clearer, more objective selection criteria.

7. Legal Structure
   Mode Stance: Proper legal structure is essential, but $200k seems high and jurisdiction shopping is concerning. A clear legal opinion on the chosen structure should be required before any funds move.
   Leans: Slightly against - too much uncertainty for immediate approval.

8. Timing
   Mode Stance: There's validity to acting during a potential bull market, but Cardano's DeFi has grown a lot without this intervention.
   Leans: Slightly against - organic growth suggests the urgency doesn't fully justify the risk.

9. KPIs and Metrics
   Mode Stance: The KPIs exist but are weak. More aggressive targets with consequences for missing them (like fund winddown) would be appropriate.
   Leans: Against - KPIs need strength and consequences.

Verdict Breakdown:
Against: 4
Slightly against: 4
Slightly for: 0
For: 1

Recommended Modifications:
Reduce to 15-20M Ada - Prove the concept first
Add sunset clause - 3-year mandatory review/renewal
Strengthen KPIs - 8% return target with winddown trigger at <4%
Improve committee diversity - Maximum 1/3 from founding entities
Create staged deployment - Release funds in 5M Ada tranches based on milestones
Guarantee OTC execution - Binding commitments from named desks
Implement lock-up periods - Committee can't withdraw more than 10% monthly for example

Final Judgment:
The core idea has merit, but the execution plan is too loose, the amount too large, and the oversight too weak for a maiden voyage of this type. Cardano would be better served by starting with a smaller pilot program (10-15M Ada), proving the model works, then scaling based on demonstrated success.

Much credit to the proposal's authors for identifying the liquidity challenge and proposing an innovative solution. However, asking for 50M Ada with vague plans, weak oversight, and minimal returns is not responsible treasury management in my opinion. I hope my highly detailed analysis is helpful, I felt this one was deserving of it.

Cardano's DeFi sector features many well-built products, with multiple lending platforms included in that list. These lending platforms and their users could really use more volume, so if a project needs a loan they should be using the appropriate products to acquire that loan. We have seen loans for CEX listing/marketing fees from other projects, so I would expect this project to follow suit. This is not a role nor responsibility of the treasury.

L1 marketing to primarily retail users and small businesses is not a focus of funding at this point in time for me. One enterprise adoption agreement could bring a much higher quantity of consistent users to the L1 than any region-focused retail growth initiative. We should be looking for more network usage, not more token holders.

Added clarity and less double-voting are good improvements to the constitution.

There is no reason to challenge the enacting of the previously voted for CC to replace the ICC in a timely fashion to avoid a pause in governance.

Teams should be paying for their own listings, either by taking loans or using their own budgets. It is not the treasury's responsibility to pay for every CNT to be listed on every exchange, and if one receives that treatment they all deserve that treatment.

Teams should be paying for their own listings, either by taking loans or using their own budgets. It is not the treasury's responsibility to pay for every CNT to be listed on every exchange, and if one receives that treatment they all deserve that treatment.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

This vote aligns with my Ekklesia votes, where I voted yes to the highest priority budget line items that fit within my preferred 200m ADA budget, abstained from voting on any line items that I may have had personal interests in, and voted no to everything else.

Seeing as the 2025 Intersect budget is being split into per-line-item withdrawal voting, I must stick to my original <200m Ada budget picks and therefore must vote "No" on anything that didn't make the cut on that list. I am simply sticking to my belief that anything more than 200m Ada in a single year is irresponsible treasury spending, and sticking to the priority line items I selected and voted for.

As an Intersect-developed platform, Gov Tool should be funded via the Intersect annual budget rather than direct treasury funding.

This platform needs to mature a lot more before becoming treasury-funded. It is full of inaccuracies in its dApp tracking. It may benefit from removing all subjective and human-updated verdicts, moving to a purely on-chain-data-driven approach. It should be applying to be included in the Intersect budget rather than seeking direct treasury funding.

Invalid governance action.

A Rust node will be very valuable to our ecosystem, and node diversity is a crucial step that needs to be taken very soon. This team is promising and I'm confident they will deliver.

This budget is massively beyond both the NCL I voted for as well as the sum of all budget items I voted for, therefore I cannot vote yes.

Though I may have voted yes for one or more of these line items, I voted no for at least one other, and therefore I cannot vote yes on this info action. If it was comprised of only line items I voted yes on, I'd be able to vote yes, but that is not the case here.

Setting NCLs with arbitrary time periods is a bad idea. They need to be set from January 1 to December 31 of each year.

200,000,000 ADA is a much more reasonable spending limit than what has been proposed previously. As we are looking at a half-year budget at this late point in 2025, 200m ensures there won't be excessive spending.

300m ADA may be fitting for a 12 month budget, however we're almost halfway through the year, so I would expect the net change limit to appropriately reflect the timeline that is being funded. If treasury income was approximately 168m for a 6 month period in 2024, then a net change limit closer to that figure would better suit the timeline. I'm aware that NCL does not determine the budget, but it does give the budget a guardrail, and with the excessive budget figures being proposed lately, it seems we could use a safe guardrail to prevent budget abuse. As for 2026 net change limit, it's still far too early to determine a realistic figure. In current volatile market conditions, the future fiat value of ADA is too difficult to predict. I would prefer to vote on 2026 NCL at the end of 2025.

350m ADA may be fitting for a 12 month budget, however we're almost halfway through the year, so I would expect the net change limit to appropriately reflect the timeline that is being funded. If treasury income was approximately 168m for a 6 month period, then a net change limit within 5% of that figure would better suit the timeline.

I am aligned with this roadmap and look forward to advancements in the L1's throughput, especially via Leios; and also look forward to the exploration of alternate incentive models for stake pools, putting more emphasis on pledge-benefit.

The treasury will soon hold 4% of ADA's circulating supply, which is too high. Somewhere around 1% would make a lot more sense. If we want to spend more, ADA will need to increase in value. Cutting the tax that goes to the treasury by around half would create more urgency around fiscal responsibility and around avoiding over-spending in the annual budget. It's great that we have a significant runway of ADA in the treasury, and that ADA should increase in fiat value by a massive amount very soon, but we shouldn't feel so comfortable proposing massive budgets without generating organic treasury income first. Higher staking rewards will make the ADA token more attractive to retail users, should bring more users and should help dApps experience higher volumes. In summary, this would be good for Cardano users and would light a fire under us to start generating actual income and not relying so heavily on reserve ADA.

A technology-based constitution should not be left up to subjective interpretation of what is "reasonable". It should be black and white. These concerns were expressed several weeks ago, and there was lots of time to address them before submitting this proposal. I would like to see a clear constitution with no grey area to avoid future constitutional conflicts.

Increasing K:

• Increases the number of effective stake pools on the network, increasing decentralization.
• Causes multipools to go over maximum saturation, forcing their delegated ADA to spread out to already existing, smaller, single pools.
• Multipools are hosted on centralized cloud services, so they won't double their number of pools as it would also double their operational costs.
• Allows a0 to become more effective for smaller pools who can't afford millions of ADA in pledge.

私もその意見に同意し、今後も Cardano がそのルーツに忠実であり続けることを楽しみにしています。

Associating hard forks with memecoins doesn't seem appropriate. We as a community and a protocol are more serious than that.