drep1yf6xkrz2w4fdk...

this is worth the risk of it failing. It should however be noted that the 5am foundation should intend to realize their long term vision of not needing to rely on the treasury.

yes. eternl is very needed, but need to figure out their business model, which is fair game after having assumed catalyst as a business model. This is a great initiative to get their self funding off the ground, while being net-neutral/positive to the treasury.

hell yes. this is Ethereum's remix for Cardano. Remix is responsible for A LOT of the success of EVM and Solidity. It serves as much as dev tooling than it serves as onboarding and education tool. Highly needed and great potential

terribly expensive, as i think the IOR team should/can become leaner, but in principle, yes.

i like this, because its a truly independent initiative. no intersect, no founding entities. great stuff. However, I have 2 critical problems with it that dont let me vote yes for this at this time. Please resubmit with the mentioned adjustments below.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

1. 2m ada management overhead is a lot of overhead for 10m ada of total OS support budget. 500k usd in current ADAUSD terms is not a lot for 3y, granted, but the initiative is not a full time job and the upside for Christian, personally, is massive. Gambling on getting rich from the treasury should not be part of the proposal.. Also granted, Christian does just as likely take the risk of the downside of denominating it purely in ada, and I appreciate that he does.
   To be clear: i dont say he shouldnt get a salary, but 3y is a long time, and if prices go up, the Cardano treasury is massively overpaying for what this should be worth. Thus, Id appreciate a clause on the upside of this proposal, like a cap in USD terms.

2. I very much miss how this effort relates to parallel efforts of say Intersect's TSC retainer program, Intersect's OS support budget, CF budgets, Catalyst funding, and others. Given all the existing efforts, there is high change that projects could get double funded. Id rather see this proposal to fund projects, and the others to donate their budgets back to the treasury, but there is some highly coordinated effort needed to make that happen.

not needed at this time.

yes. presence is required.

no. mismanagement of funds last year, countless proposals elsewhere in some form or another and way too many projects which are not needed, or not needed at the moment, or handled elsewhere.

thx for resubmission

yes. Cardano's presence in Singapore is required.

its cool, but I dont understand how this should work in practice and the demo is not demonstrating that. Also, i dont think the treasury is a good funding vehicle for this, as its a business model.

yes. the Cardano Summit - especially in Singapore is critical for the future of Cardano.

very cool. but no - respectively no, not at this point.
i hope this does not defer the motivation of the proposers too much, as their work is fantastic, but the current landscape of contract languages and nodes is large enough. This may and will hopefully change in the future.

first withdrawal: yes. LOADS of good effort in here for valuable things.
second withdrawal: lets see. I think i even prefer three withdrawals.. slow ramp up.

good opportunity and reach!

good team and project.
minor complaints/questions, but

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Apart from inflated costs for Christina, I dont have anything materially against this proposal. In fact, I find 3 node implementations substantially better than 2. On the one hand, this is positive for Amaru, as SPOs and everyone else running nodes, will now REALLY have to actively choose what they run, which means more eyes fall on Amaru and there is more noise around alternatives. Potentially even more noise around Cardano in general. On the other hand, this is positive for Cardano, as even the best split between 2 node implementations (50/50) is not enough for a majority chain rule to decide which side is which upon a bug. A 3 way split (albeit that never will reach 33/33/33) is much more resilient.

Blinklabs/Dingo is a solid team to develop a third implementation, while proving since years of Catalyst development for this, they can, and do deliver.

The proposal is well laid out, and, apart from weak/unprofessional language, good enough in my opinion.

I would like to see/understand what precise differences the 3 implementations have from another and where Dingo stands out and what it brings to the table.
"Its written in Go" is not an argument or a feature. Its just a choice.

E.g. With Amaru not being able to sync from scratch but only snapshots to become ultralightweight is a clear differentiation. - would Dingo cover this?

The budget process is still terrible, but intersect is doing a fine job.

good team. good transparency. good project.

id prefer a lower NCL for treasury sustainability reasons and for the fact that 350m were already too much last period, which invited too much grifting.

this would actually be more fitting to catalyst. Im not a fan of this, as its yet another project trying to bite into the defi cake, but vote yes either way, as its a nice proposal, grass roots approach and 1.5m isnt outrageous. They should get one attempt at this.

yes. incremental improvements are good.

its fine, a solid plan, but to my ears its too specific in too many places to count as "continuation" of the initial roadmap, which just defined an end-state. This proposal sounds like a wishlist, which, if approved, could be exploited for budget & TW requests.

i am FOR what they have created, but dont consider it to be an "official" roadmap - as there is no official anymore. This info action could become a Trojan horse as reference in future TWs (by arguing: "you voted for the roadmap, so you must vote yes on this budget request and this TW request, otherwise the roadmap's fulfilment is in danger, which means in Cardano is in danger, and its your fault. ".
there is at the grander scheme of things nothing wrong with a "pre-budgetInfoAction-InfoAction", as the items are solid, but approving this without values might block other, "un"official developments, contributions from being realizable. In fact, this might even destroy the "market" (=treasury) for companies to contribute to Cardano and thus hurt decentralization.

Since they dont mention that this is not a Trojan horse for future budget requests, which Charles would not unlikely hold against the community again, like he did for the previous budget round, where he accused everyone who votes against the monolithical and rather intransparent IO budget of destroying Cardano and critique to any part of the budget got aggressive responses like "then you decided that IO and me leave Cardano. fine. help yourselves". (sry. shouldnt have been a Charles rant at all. just using him / his past to make a point.) - i vote abstain not to block it, but also not to ignore my red flags

sure. why not. even though i dont like the effective outcome of an increase in veto power, due to the two-thirds majority rule.

This NO vote is a call for a higher standard, not a blocker to progress.
We cannot afford to normalize subpar processes simply because the subject matter is urgent; doing so undermines the long-term integrity of decentralized governance.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

While I fully recognise the necessity of this Governance Action and the value it aims to deliver to the ecosystem, I vote NO on this governance action. I dont vote no to block this GA, that train has left, I vote no to not compromise the decentralized principles that secure the Cardano network and have a unilateral celebration of that compromise go on the record. I do not condone the excuses of NDA requirements, as I can understand that the nature of the business demands privacy in numbers. I do not condone the aims of the Governance Action or want to delegitimise the effort that already went, and will still need to go in it. Also do I recognise that 70m likely wont be enough to cover all the bills. I want to respect and thank the proposers for that.
However, to me, decentralized governance relies on rigorous process standards, which the proposers simply don't follow. The "Pentad", a term I despise, spits in the face of all the effort that went into forming decentralized Governance in the past year. It appears to establish the same founding entity power structure as before Voltaire. In my mind, approving this action in its current form would validate a precedent of unilateral authority that sidesteps the inclusive oversight decentralized Governance tried to establish and our Constitution strives to uphold.

Cardano Curia was not my choice, but no reason not to say yes to this. All in order.
Thanks to all applicants! and Thank you Cardano Curia for your service.

In the light that this anyway passes, I vote no, not because I dislike the plan, whats presented, or dont understand that confidentiality is required within its context, but because I dont agree with the "eat or die" mentality of the almighty 5 proposers, who are really only controlled by 2 entities

This is an ad-hoc, rushed, temporary solution to a unnecessarily created problem (submitting a TW GA that vacuums up the remainder of the NCL last minute). That GA could easily wait until an NCL 26, or, even better, an alternative budget control mechanism than a speed limit, is defined.
A) There is no issue with NOT spending the whole amount of the NCL, in fact, it would be a great sign of ecosystem maturity, if the speed limit isnt maxed out immediately.
B) There is no reason why the Critical Integrations Budget TW gets a special treatment and shouldnt wait until things are in order again. After all, defining a new NCL takes the same time as accepting this weird short time extension.
C) chill the f out and think forwardly. dont just look 2cm in front of your toes.

nope. i agree to where they come from, compensation for cc and drep roles is a topic to be had at large, but 1m is just outrageous and in extension: any large enough amount is a terrible idea for stable continuity.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Im not categorically against compensating CC members, but the amount is so outrageously high that it warps incentives for future CC candidates.
Honestly? Id even consider 10k per CC seat (yes. thats 70k total, not per individual CC member) a lot.

Compensation also massively disincentivises CC consortiums as it would benefit individuals the most. In which case, we would literally need to rely on the individual opinions and moodswings of just 7 people.

I think a reasonable amount would be between 1000 and 5000 ada per year per seat. Thats low enough to not be a reason to apply and high enough to cover material costs, and/or a group dinner - considerable as "thanks" from the community.

Looked at from a different angle:

The whole blockchain currently earns about 3.6m ada every year in fees.
If 1m or 27% of the total revenue of the chain would be the cost to securing constitutionality in a programmable environment, then the trifecta governance model should be deemed at a failure.

aa

YES!

Really nice initiative.

already approved the previous one. I commend Yutas persistence and willingness to listen to feedback and submit another update.

for lack of better options: yes. and yes for community collab.
next year I will vote no on this.

yes

weird. not sure what to make of it yet. Is this a trojan horse for IO to grift for 5y?

abstain

better than the first, but still: what constitutes a stable coin?

Whats the selection mechanism for which pairs get liquidity and which companies get the contracts?

no

good initiative and reasonably priced.

yes

i like the loan structure. even if there could be massive improvements to how they are proving certain things and the terms with which they aim to do things.
I also think 0.03% interest is a joke.

this belongs into catalyst. Has nothing to do with the chain itself

not necessary and much of it should be the job of govtools or tempo

sounds good on the surface, but the deliverables are heavily skewed towards benefitting one company.

Cardano being the smart contract layer for BTC is not a given, so this is a risk item, which belongs to Catalyst.

I am not against IO, I respect them and commend for what got delivered.
I am also not against what they propose.
But I am very much against how they expect this proposal to be sufficient in detail that justifies the large amount of money it asks for. The alternative budget item from the TSC from the Ekklesia process included all/most of this, even pre-attributing most of the items to IO already. I think it was MUCH more mature, and contained proper checks and balances and included parties across the ecosystem that need to collaborate to bring items to life. Assigning everything to one company is unsustainable for the future of Cardano.

This proposal feels like a rubberstamp to what IO is doing.

Solid team and good progression/ show of commitment and skill of team to deliver, but waaaaaay waaaaaayy too expensive. However, given lack of alternatives (tempo.vote exists, but its proposal is too bad to consider serious), and lack of history, this is ok as a start in the first year. Would not vote on the same amounts again next year though.

Look.. i like tempo, im using it rn (also on purpose) to vote, but this proposal is atrocious and unacceptable. Please include some accountability and dont expect a blank check.

the best proposal so far. and i mean that not bc of what it aims to produce (an alternative node, which I like too), but bc of how well the proposal is written and structured. Thats the gold standard so far. more of this.

yes, with the condition that Treasury Withdrawals for it are proposed separately.

yes, with the condition that Treasury Withdrawals for it are proposed separately.

dont like that they are bulked, and not at all that it doesnt talk about how money is distributed, managed, etc. , but I already voted yes for those on Ekklesia.

better define smth until EOY, instead of a random date in the middle.
Also, no reason to define a NCL for such a far-away time period when the learnings about the first cycle are just about to happen.

fine

good roadmap

i want to first see a stable budget, and experience how much is actually needed before we reasonably can talk about changing tau

Raising k damages the stability of the ecosystem in many ways, but the primary reason is operational resilience of block producing nodes. With a larger k, the profitability of running a pool goes down, as the total epoch rewards remain the same, but are distributed to a larger set of block producers. At the same time, running a node doesnt get cheaper, meaning the majority of pools have even tighter margins than they already have, leading to a decrease in quality of node setups (cheaper).